Abstract We study how firms select partners using a large database of publicly announced R&D alliances over a period of 25 years. We identify, for the first time, two distinct behavioral strategies of firms in forming these alliances. By reconstructing and analysing the temporal R&D network of 14,000 international firms and 21.000 publicly announced alliances, we find a "universal" behavior in firms changing between these strategies. In the first strategy, newcomers and nodes of low centrality initially establish links to nodes of similar or higher centrality. After these firms have consolidated their position and increased their centrality, they switch to the second strategy, and preferably form links to less central nodes. In addition, we show that k-core centrality can be established as a measure of firm's success that correlates e.g. with the number of patents (obtained from a dataset of 3 Mio patents). To synthezise our findings, we provide a network growth model based on k-core centrality which reproduces the strategic behavior of firms, as well as other properties of the empirical network. The growth of real networks is often explained by the preferential attachment rule [1] , which only assumes that newcomers in a network prefer to connect to the node with the highest degree. This allows to reproduce the power-law distribution of node degrees and the emergence of nodes with profound importance, but it fails to explain saturated growth, or even decline [2] , of real networks. In real networks strategic considerations with whom to link govern the growth process [3] . For example, firms searching for partners to form an R&D alliance have to consider complementarities in their knowledge base, but also the network position of their counterparts. This, however, is an important limitation, as it requires full knowledge of the network connections of all counterparts. Hence, in many economic and social networks nodes have to find other ways to improve their position in a competitive environment.
The growth of real networks is often explained by the preferential attachment rule [1] , which only assumes that newcomers in a network prefer to connect to the node with the highest degree. This allows to reproduce the power-law distribution of node degrees and the emergence of nodes with profound importance, but it fails to explain saturated growth, or even decline [2] , of real networks. In real networks strategic considerations with whom to link govern the growth process [3] . For example, firms searching for partners to form an R&D alliance have to consider complementarities in their knowledge base, but also the network position of their counterparts. This, however, is an important limitation, as it requires full knowledge of the network connections of all counterparts. Hence, in many economic and social networks nodes have to find other ways to improve their position in a competitive environment.
Here, we use the k-core centrality [4] to quantify the importance of nodes in an R&D network, and we show that this measure is highly correlated (more than other widely used centrality measures) with the number of patents filed by the nodes. This way, we link an external -publicly available-source of information to internal properties that are used for link formation. Additionally, we identify two different strategies in choosing partners dependent on the importance of the node itself. These apply either to newcomers or to established nodes. Newcomers, or nodes of little importance, usually establish links to nodes of similar or higher importance, very much like new PhD students team up with fellow students or postdocs in their group, but rarely with famous professors. After these new nodes have established their position and gained considerably in importance, they switch their strategy and preferably establish links to nodes of less importance. In the example at hand, the reputed professor is less likely to restrict his contacts to other professors of similar reputation and more likely to younger graduate students. Likewise, established firms rarely focus their R&D collaboration on other established firms which often have become their competitors. Instead, they are more likely to search for, and to team up with, new start-up companies with fresh ideas.
To empirically verify these two strategies, we analyze the formation of R&D alliances between firms, using a database of 21,572 publicly announced alliances between 14,000 international firms from different economic sectors during 1984 -2009 . In addition, given that the purpose of an R&D collaboration is to create new products, we measure their output by the number of patents filled by every firm, using a database of about three million patents granted in the U.S.A., as described in the Materials and Methods section. By representing firms with nodes and alliances with links connecting two nodes, we map the alliance formation process to a growing complex network. Nodes have to choose between the establishment of a new link with another node (alliance with a new partner) and the increase of the weight of an already existing link (alliance with an existing partner). Hence, at every time step the degree of a node represents its mere number of R&D alliances with distinct partners, while the weight of a link between two nodes represents the number of times these two nodes formed an R&D alliance.
Empirical Results
The importance of nodes in a network is usually quantified by centrality [5] . In fact, the most central nodes are often shown to be the most influential [6] , the most fit [7] , or the most (topologically) important [8] ones. Here, we measure centrality based on a recently proposed weighted k-core decomposition method [9] . This method decomposes a network based on the weighted degree of the nodes following a pruning procedure described in the "Materials and Methods" section. In a nutshell, we remove all nodes with degree less than k ′ , until all the remaining nodes have minimum degree k ′ + 1. The removed nodes are labeled with a shell number (k s ) equal to k ′ , and the shell with the largest k s value is called the core of the network. The closer a node is located to the core, the more central this node is. We define variable called coreness, C, which measures the distance between the shell a node belongs to from the core, i.e. the smaller the value of C, the more central -and the more important -the node is.
Of course, the time period for which we construct the network may affect the centrality ranking of nodes (see SI text). Hereafter, we will call C F the coreness ranking obtained using the full time period from 1984 -2009 . In this case, we find that the network is decomposed to 17 k-shells, and the firms that are represented by the nodes of the core (i.e. they have C F = 0) are: France Telecom, Nortel Networks, Hitachi, Sanyo Electric, Microsoft, Oki Electric Ind., Philips Electronics, Matsushita Electric, Nippon Telegraph & Telephone, Fujitsu, AT&T, Mitsubishi Electric, Motorola, Sony, Apple, Nec, Hewlett Packard, Toshiba, and IBM.
With the k-core method we are able to rank nodes according to their centrality, and to group them in shells of similar importance. But, more importantly, the k-core ranking is highly correlated with the number of patents, an external metric which may be used to gauge the output of R&D alliances. More precisely, as discussed in the SI text, the Kendall's pairwise correlation between number of patents and the correness ranking is τ C F = −0.84 (p < 0.001), while for the degree ranking it is τ d = 0.5 (p < 0.001), and for the ranking obtained using betweenness centrality it is τ b = 0.25 (p < 0.001). Note that coreness is negatively correlated with the number of patents, because the smaller C is, the more central the node is. Therefore, we may safely assume that the k-core method provides a better connection -with respect to degree or betweeness centrality-between public information (number of patents) and node centrality, which is an internal topological measure of the network. Fig. 1A illustrates a growing network where, similar to real R&D networks, nodes create new links either with a new or with an existing partner. As the network grows both in size and density, new k-shells emerge, while the coreness of nodes is updated according to their connectivity patterns. In Fig. 1B we show the real R&D network in the year of 2009, when the core mentioned above has formed (red nodes), and in Fig. 1C we plot the number of nodes in each k-shell versus the coreness C of this shell. A strong core-periphery structure is observed, i.e. the majority of nodes is located in the periphery, indicated by large C values, while only a small number is topologically close to the core of the network.
The role of individual coreness in the link formation process between two nodes is quantified in Fig. 2 . If we exclude nodes that form a link for a very first time, it becomes obvious that existing nodes tend to find partners with similar coreness. This result highlights the existence of degree-degree correlations and is in line with a positive assortativity coefficient [10] which for the case of the R&D network is r = 0.166. Similar values, ranging from 0.12 to 0.363 were reported for various collaboration networks, like scientific co-authorship networks [10] .
The R&D network grows as new nodes form their first link. From the preferential attachment rule we would expect these new nodes to preferably create links with the already central ones. But, as shown in Fig. 2B this is not the case. By monitoring the link fomation process over the whole period we find that even though the core-nodes are involved in most of the total links, only a small fraction of almost 15% are links to previously disconnected nodes, while this fraction is about 25% for nodes with intermediate coreness (C ∈ [4, 13] ). Thus, even if new nodes have the preference (and the incentive) to create links with central nodes, in reality they end up linked with other new nodes (i.e. nodes with similar centrality) or with the less central existing ones.
This could result from a selection rule that applies to the central nodes. The already central nodes, in order to further increase their centrality, should establish links with other nodes in their topological neighborhood [11] . However, as nodes become more central, other effects, like capacity constrains, and competition with other central nodes become more important. To demonstrate this, we monitor for both involved nodes the change in coreness that results from the link formation (see SI text). For every node we calculate the total number of links it forms every year, its own average coreness value throughout the year C o , and the average coreness of the nodes it was linked (partner nodes) C p . These coreness values are normalized with the total number of k-shells in the annual network, in order to obtain C 
, and we repeat the same calculation for the years after t c , using as weighs the fractions of the nodes' annual activity over their total activity. This is done in order to avoid giving the same importance to a dC ′ calculated for years of low activity with a dC ′ calculated for years of high activity, which would introduce an unwanted bias in our results. In addition, for both periods we calculate the average ⟨dC ′ ⟩ for all nodes with the same coreness score (i.e. nodes at the same k-shell) when considering the final state of the network at the end of 2009 for both periods before and after t c , and we calculate the difference ∆ ⟨dC ′ ⟩ = ⟨dC ′ ⟩ before − ⟨dC ′ ⟩ after .
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As shown in in Fig. 3 at t c nodes universally change their alliance formation strategy i.e. they start forming links to nodes with less centrality. This indicates that for more central nodes the competition with other nodes of similar or higher centrality becomes more important than the opportunity to further increase their own centrality through a new link with another central node. This shift in the alliance formation strategy cannot be anticipated based on the assortativity measure. It is also not explained if we assume a limiting choice factor that would force firms with high degrees to randomly choose partners in a uniform way. Therefore, it provides an interesting insight about a previously not explored phase in the link formation process that drives network evolution. But, it is not clear if this shift occurs due to strategic considerations or due to the abundance of choice created by the appearance of newcomers. To address this question, based on our empirical analysis, we model the alliance formation process as follows.
Modelling the Alliance Formation
To provide a realistic modeling scenario, we start with a random network of 7 nodes and 11 links, which is equal in size and density to the empirical R&D network of 1984. Since we are interested in the cumulative network, our model network should grow with time. Due to the annual resolution of our data, one modeling timestep represents one calendar year. New nodes and links are added every year, but, we set their number equal to the 1/10 of the number of nodes and links added the same year in the empirical network. This way we create smaller networks that allows for efficient calculations of network properties over many repetitions, while we make sure that the density is always the same as the real network.
Because of their nature, i.e. R&D networks are collaboration networks, isolated nodes cannot exist in the dataset. Thus, at every time step (year) the number of new links is always larger or equal to the number of new nodes. At the beginning of a year we add all new nodes to the network as disconnected components, and afterwards we start adding the links. To make sure that at the end there will be no disconnected nodes left, the disconnected nodes are the first ones to form a link. However, given that the higher the degree of a node the more active the node is in forming alliances, all these initial links follow a preferential attachment (PA) rule. For the remaining links, and in order to respect this degree-activity relation, we select one partner with PA, and a second partner following a selection rule, which for now we will call rule 1. To accommodate for the formation of consortia, after a link is established, with probability p we allow the node with the smaller degree to connect to one of the neighboring nodes of its new partner. The selection from the list of the partner's neighboring nodes in this case follows another rule, i.e. rule 2.
Using some combinations between rule 1 and rule 2, we tested the performance of three different model variants. The first variant (V 1 ), assumes that both rule 1 and rule 2 are PA. The second variant (V 2 ) assumes that rule 1 is PA and rule 2 is a random selection. Finaly, the third variant (V 3 ) assumes that rule 1 is based on a probability p c that is related to the coreness of the nodes as p c ∼ e −C √ N C , and rule 2 is again a random selection. The particular non-linear form of the probability distribution p c is used to make nodes with higher centrality (smaller C values) more appealing for potential partners. Also, because the k-shells have unequal sizes, N C is the number of nodes in the network with coreness value C, and is used as a correction factor.
In Fig. 4A we plot the degree distribution of three different network ensembles (each one corresponding to one of the above variants), obtained from 100 model realizations, alongside the degree distribution of the full empirical network. As shown in Fig. 4A , all variants reproduce well the empirical degree distribution, which follows a power law with exponent γ = 2.06 ± 0.02. The exponent is calculated using the maximum likelihood method (mle) [12] and the power-law hypothesis cannot be rejected with p= 0.85. The same holds for all the three variants and for all p values tested, as well (see SI text). However, not all model variants perform equally well with respect to other network metrics. For example, V 1 and V 2 result to networks with negative assortativity coefficient, while V 3 provides networks with r ≃ 0.145, which is close to the value r = 0.166 of the empirical network. As discussed in detail in the SI text, and shown in Fig.S11 , V 3 constantly outperforms all the rest, and the optimal probability for consortium formation is p = 0.8.
In addition, as shown in Fig. 4B , V 3 is even able to reproduce well the coreness distribution of the real data. We should note, however, that for Fig. 4B we used the empirical cumulative R&D network only up to 1990. This is because for this period the empirical network has 967 nodes and 1055 links, and therefore is of a similar size to the model network which in turn consists of 1390 nodes and 1947 links.
Nevertheless, as shown in Fig. 4C , a change in the alliance formation behavior is observed in all our model variants, even though no assumptions about strategic behavior was used. This allows us to conclude that, while the strategic arguments may still be plausible and even play some role, the observed change is due to the abundance of choice in a growing network where newcomers enter at every time step.
Discussion
Using k-core centrality to analyze data about the alliance formation of firms, we identified two different strategies for nodes that affect their position in a network. The first strategy, namely to initially link with nodes of similar importance (centrality), helps to get established and to increase in importance. The switch to the second strategy, namely to link with nodes of much less importance, occurs "universally". This is surprising, since for a node the second strategy comes with a cost: they not only stop to increase their importance, but even face a decrease. Two possible interpretations for the existence of this shift were tested. A) it could be the outcome of strategic decisions that results from the struggle in a competitive environment, and B) it could just be the result of abundance of choice among newcomers.
To test these hypotheses we modeled the alliance formation process using the coreness of nodes. In addition, as benchmark we used two additional model variants based on the well studied preferential attachment rule.
Our findings show that the coreness-based model is able to reproduce more accurately a wide range of empirical network metrics. However, the shift in alliance formation strategy is observed in all of the model variants. Based on this finding, and considering that all our model variants were minimalistic in their assumptions, we conclude that the shift in alliance behavior is due to the abundance of choice resulting from newcomer nodes.
With our modeling approach we also address two general limitations that apply to all modeling schemes based on topological arguments. The first one is about information available to newcomer nodes. I.e. how realistic is it to assume that a newcomer knows the network position (coreness, degree, etc.) of all other nodes in the network in order to choose a partner accordingly? Here we overcome this limitation using node-specific information about the success of nodes, obtained from a different network. Specifically, this is the number of patents resulting from a patent network that is public information to the firms. We demonstrate that this external information strongly correlates with topological information from the original R&D network, i.e. with the coreness. Hence, we can safely assume that a newcomer uses this public information as a proxy for the missing one, namely the topological position of its partner.
The second limitation results from capacity constrains of existing nodes. I.e. how realistic is it to assume that a newcomer node is always accepted by a central node? With the simple preferential attachment rule we end up in a dissasortative network, since all newcomers will create links to already central nodes. But the real network is assortative because, due to capacity constrains, not all link requests to central nodes can materialize. Thus, nodes choose to create alliances with partners of similar centrality, a behavior that is reproduced as well by our coreness-based growth model. Closing, we conjecture that our findings can be observed in other activities that require collaboration in a growing network in the presence of competition.
Materials and Methods

Data
In this work we used two different datasets, one about firm alliance information, and one about firm knowledge production. The firm alliance information is extracted from the Thomson Reuters' SDC Platinum alliances database, and the knowledge production is obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER patent database.
From the SDC database we used a total number of 21,572 alliance reports obtained by all the publicly announced R&D partnerships from 1984 to 2009, for all kinds of economic actors (including firms, investors, banks and universities). We associated every firm with its 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, which enabled us to classify them to the right industrial sector of activity. The R&D network is constructed by linking two firms every time an alliance is announced in the dataset. When an alliance involved more than two firms (consortium), all the firms involved were connected in pairs, resulting into a fully connected clique. Multiple links between the same firms are allowed (two firms can have more than one collaboration on different projects), while isolated firms -i.e. firms that had no alliances in a given period -are not part of the network.
Because the SDC database does not provide a unique identifier for each firm, all associations between firm alliances (i.e. the construction of the R&D network) are based on the firm names reported in the dataset. Therefore, we corrected for the cases where two or more entries with different names corresponded to the same firm, by manually controlling for spelling, legal extensions (e.g. LTD, INC, etc.), and any other recurrent key words (e.g. BIO, TECH, PHARMA, LAB, etc.) that could affect the matching between different entries referring to the same company. We decided to keep as separated entities the subsidiaries of the same firm located in different countries.
The NBER patent database contains detailed information on about almost three million patents granted in the U.S.A. between 1974 and 2006. Every patent is associated with one or more assignees and is classified according to the International Patent Classification (IPC) system. In general the NBER database is of very high quality, and allowed us to cross-link the firm names involved in alliance formation events in the SDC database with patent information. From the NBER database we constructed another network of firms where the links represent co-occurrence in the same patent. Thus, the same set of firms participates in a multi-layered network. Here, even though we do not fully exploit this multi-layered structure, we are able to understand the network evolution process in one layer by using information like the degree (number of patents) from the other layer.
k-core decomposition
The k-core decomposition method has its roots to social network analysis [4] , and it aims to measure the relative importance of a vertex (node) within the network. In general, the k-core decomposition of a graph is obtained by recursively removing all vertices with degree less than k, and assign to them a shell number k s equal to k. The shell with the largest k value is called the core of the network, and the distance from the core can be seen as a measure of importance of the nodes. Since the method as described above uses only information about the node degree and ignores the existence of link weights, we will call it unweighted k-core decomposition, and the distance of a node from the core of the network will be called unweighted coreness, C u .
The unweighted method has been applied successfully in various real-world networks [13, 14] , and it received recently much attention due to Kitsak et al. who showed that the location of a node in the network's core structure is a more accurate predictor of its spreading potential with respect to its degree k [6] . This is explained because, despite the (expected) strong correlation between the degree and the C u , there are nodes with high degree that are located in external shells of the network.
The centrality measure used in our study is actually a weighted coreness, C w , calculated from a recently proposed extension of the classic k-core decomposition method. This extension considers in the calculation the weights of the links as well as the degree of the node, and is called weighted k-core decomposition [9] . The weighted method applies the same pruning routine used in the unweighted version, but, it uses an alternative measure for the node degree that is called weighted degree, k ′ , which considers both the degree k of a node and the weights of its links. The weighted degree of a node i is defined as
where k i is the degree of node i, and ∑ k i j w j is the sum over all its link weights [9] . However, in order to simplify the notation, we call this weighted measure "coreness", C.
According to the assumption that a firm with a large number of patents is important from the R&D perspective, throughout this work we used the values α = 1 and β = 0.2 which maximize the correlation between a firm's centrality and its total number of patents (see discussion in the SI text). However, we tested the effect of choosing a different parameter set, like α = 1 and β = 1, and it does not significantly alter our conclusions. Plot of the average normalized partner coreness deviation ⟨dC ′ ⟩ before and after t c . The shaded area shows the coreness deviation using a network where we kept the node degree sequence of the empirical network, but we randomly shuffled the alliance links. The observed deviation in the real network is much larger than the one observed in the shuffled network. We preformed a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to the distributions of the ∆ ⟨dC ′ ⟩ for the empirical and the shuffled network, and we can reject that they are the same with p = 0.056. Insets: examples of the normalized coreness evolution of firms with different C F values (blue circles), and the average normalized coreness evolution of their partners (open circles). The size of the open circle is proportional to the fraction of collaborations involving the particular firm happened in a given year over the total number of collaborations of this firm. With a red vertical line we mark the t c , to visually clarify the change in collaboration behavior before and after this point. It is interesting to note that the firms are more active during the first phase, when they try to maximize their centrality. The Supplementary Information is organized as follows. In Seciton "Network analysis" we discuss about the construction and the properties of the R&D network, and we make a connection with previous works. In Section "Analysis of the k-shells" we discuss in detail the results of the weighted and the unweighted k-core decomposition. In Section "Correlation between centrality and number of patents" we study how the the results of the weighted k-core method are related to other centrality measures, and how centrality is correlated with the "success" of a firm. In Section "Normalized coreness evolution" we discuss about the evolution of our measure of centrality, where we give details about the methodology followed for the annual coreness analysis, and we provide results about different firms supporting the conclusions of our manuscript. Closing, in
Section "Model results" we provide results from our model's different variants, and we discuss their performance in reproducing properties of the empirical network.
In a recent work Tomasello et al.
[17] performed a detailed analysis of the structural properties and the evolution of the full empirical R&D network and its main sectoral sub-networks. Repeating such a detailed analysis is out of the scope of our current work, however, we will highlight some properties of the network evolution that we feel are essential to provide the reader with a more detailed view of the system.
In general, the R&D network is characterized by a pronounced cyclic evolution. In Fig. S1a we plot the networks created by alliance formation in three different years, while in Fig. S1b we show three snapshots of the cumulative network for the same years. It is clear that the annual network of 1994 is bigger (larger number of nodes) and more connected (larger number of links) that the other two. The full evolution of all the annual networks is shown in Fig. S1c , where the cyclic evolution of the network, with is growth and decline becomes clear.
Additionally, given that trough alliance formations knowledge from one firm may be transferred to another, it is interesting to study the overall connectivity of the cumulative network, as t is the one that contains the full history of alliance formation. More precisely, it is interested to study how the cluster size distribution of the cumulative network evolves.
Using an approach from percolation theory [18], the average cluster size of the network is calculated by
where m is the size of clusters and i m is the number of clusters of size m. Accordingly we calculate the reduced average cluster size I ′ av , that is the average cluster size without the largest cluster
The evolution of I av and I ′ av is shown in Fig. S1d . At the early years the network is fragmented to many isolated -in general small -clusters, but from a very early stage a larger cluster emerges. Eventually, right after 1989 -1990 the size of the largest cluster diverges very fast and after 1992 -1993 it dominates the network. This domination of the largest cluster means that knowledge can diffuse in the network more effectively in the later years, with profound effects on firm productivity. 
Analysis of the k-shells
We applied both, the unweighted and weighted, k-core decomposition methods to the cumulative network spanning the whole time period from 1985 to 2009. Initially, for the weighted method we used α = β = 1. Since both methods provide us with ranked ordered lists, we compared their outcomes using the Kendall's τ correlation coefficient. In general, we find that this correlation is very high τ = 0.998 ± 0.001, p < 10 −15 . However, since we are studying the cumulative network Table S 1: Firms identified as the core of the R&D network using the weighed k-core decomposition method with α = β = 1, and the unweighted k-core decomposition method.
where the weights of the links represent the actual number of collaborations between two firms, we would expect the weighted method to provide with more accurate ranking. Our expectation is supported by Table S1 , where we list the names of the firms located in the core as identified by both methods.
As shown in Table S1 the list of firms that were assigned in the core by both methods are totally different. However, the list that is provided by the weighted method matches better with our intuition as it contains very big and well known firms. With such a big difference in the ranking of the most central firms it is somehow surprising that we find so strong correlation in the ranking results of both methods. The picture changes if we repeat this procedure by focusing only in the 100 firms that were identified as more central by both methods. In this case, the correlation coefficient becomes τ = 0.54 ± 0.05, p < 10 −10 . Thus, we conclude that the ranking of both methods is somehow correlated, but, the strong correlation is mostly due to the large number of firms that are placed in the periphery of the network by both measures.
It is interesting to test how correlated are the rankings of nodes provided by the weighted kcore method with the rankings according to other (widely used) centrality measures, like degree centrality, eigenvector centrality [19] , and betweenness centrality [20] . As shown in Table S2 , the ranking of the weighted k-core decomposition is highly correlated with the degree centrality of the nodes. This is somehow expected, as the degree of a node is an important ingredient of the method. However, this correlation is not perfect since, in-line with our previous discussion, there could be nodes with high degree that do not belong to the more central parts of the networks. The correlation with the other measures is much lower, highlighting that different centrality measures capture different properties of the nodes.
Next, we will discuss the effect of the aggregation used to get the cumulative network on the results we get from the weighted k-core method. First, we will look into which firms form the core of the network when we only consider the annual networks. It is interesting to find out whether the firms we identified to be the most central in the cumulative network became central because they appear frequently (or even always) in the core of annual networks. As shown in the above list of tables, the core of the alliance networks that are created every year fluctuates heavily in terms of number as well as in terms of components. In addition, the presence of a company in the core of the alliance network a particular year is not enough to guarantee a presence in the cumulative core. Thus, securing a central part in the cumulative network is a result of a career path that requires long term strategic alliance formation.
Given that our weighted k-core results are based on the cumulative network, the time window used to aggregate the firm alliance activities may affect the outcome of the method. Here we discuss in detail about the existence of such aggregation effect, focusing -only -on the core firms identified by the weighted k-core method when different cumulative networks are considered. As a reference we will use the core obtained from the cumulative network aggregating the activity from 1984 to 2009. The coreness ranking obtained using this network will be called C F , therefore, the reference core will consist of all firms with C F = 0.
In order to quantify the similarities between the cores of different networks, we calculate the fraction
where core ref is the reference core, core c is the core calculated with the current aggregation time window, and . . . is an operator returning the number of unique elements in a set.
To be more precise, two different schemes of aggregation that result to different cumulative networks are considered. In the first approach, we fix the starting point to 1984, i.e. the first year we have available data, and we vary the ending point of the aggregation period. In the second approach, we fix the ending point to 2009, i.e. the last year we have available data, and we vary the starting point of the aggregation period. In Fig. S2 is shown a schematic illustration of the different aggregation methods, together with the similarity measures between the cores of different sub-periods with the reference core of the full period.
In Fig. S3 we plot the network size for the different aggregation time windows used. The shaded area highlights the range where the core we find is the same with the reference core. In general, for both methods, the same core appears when the network is big enough to include the largest part of the alliances formed. It is interesting to note that this -stable -reference core emerges wen we approach the period 1994 -2000, that is the period when the collaboration activity reached its maximum for all economic sectors.
In general, someone may argue that the observed core could be an artifact of the data, but even if this is the case, this does not affect the main finding of our manuscript, i.e. a universal shift in the collaboration activity of firms when they reach their own minimum coreness value (reach their most central position). To conclude this discussion, in the following tables we report the names of the core companies obtained by the weighted k-core method applied in networks aggregated using different time windows as shown in Fig. S2 . Here we use information from the NBER patent database to identify whether there is any correlation between the ranking of firms based on the different centrality measures considered above, and their number of patents. In order to do so, we divided the firms in classes according to their centrality scores and we calculated the average number of patents of every class. For example if we assume that there are 100 firms with degree k = 30, we put them all in the class number 30, and we assigned to this class as patent number the average number of patents of these 100 firms. By repeating this procedure for all centrality measures, we find that the Kendall's correlation coefficient between the degree and number of patents is τ = 0.5, p < 10 −12 . In the same way, the correlation coefficient between betweenness centrality and number of patents is τ = 0.25, p < 10 −15 , and the correlation between the coreness, C F -as provided by the weighted k-core decomposition method -and the number of patents is τ = −0.493, p < 0.001. Here we should remind the reader that the lower the coreness value is the closer the firm is to the core (or the more central the firm is), which explains the negative sign in the correlation coefficient.
At a first glance it seems that the ranking according to the degree, and the ranking according to the weighted coreness (using α = β = 1) is equally correlated with the number of patents. But, the weighted k-core method allows to tune the parameters α and β according to how much "weight" we want to assign to the weights and to the degree. So, it is interesting to test if there are different values of the parameters α and β that would give a higher correlation coefficient than τ = −0.493. To test this, we calculated the correlation coefficient between the number of patents and the weighted coreness for all values of the pair (α, β) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] using a step of ∆α = ∆β = 0.1. The results are shown in Table 3 . From this Table we find different values of the parameters α and β that lead to stronger correlation between C F and the number of patents, but, the strongest value τ = −0.84 is obtained for α = 1 and β = 0.2. This pair of values is used in the analysis presented in the manuscript, but we obtain almost identical results using α = β = 1, as well.
Here we would like to highlight that the upper triangular matrix is the region where α < β, which means that the results of the weighted k-core method are affected more by the link weights and less on the degree (weight-dominated region). Accordingly, the lower triangular matrix is the region where α > β, which means that the results of the weighted k-core method are affected more by the node degrees and less on the link weights (degree-dominated region). The average correlation in the weight-dominated region is ⟨τ ⟩ = −0.52 ± 0.04, while the average correlation on the degree-dominated region is ⟨τ ⟩ = −0.70 ± 0.08. From this observation we conclude that, while the weights (i.e. path dependence in alliance formation) play, indeed, role in how central Table S 3: Correlation between the number of patents and the ranking of companies provided by the weighted coreness, C F , for different values of the parameter α (rows) and β (columns). The correlation strength is expressed using Kendall's τ , and the significance level is p < 0.001. a firm can become, the degree (i.e. the total number of distinct partners) is the most important component to explain the process that increase a firm's centrality.
Closing this section, we would like to discuss about the correlation between the coreness values obtained by the weighted k-core method using α = β = 1, and the coreness values obtained using α = 1 and β = 0.2. In this case we find that τ = 0.998 p < 10 −15 , but once more this strong correlation is explained from the large number of firms located in the periphery of the network. If we use only the 100 most central firms, we find that the correlation coefficient is τ = 0.818 p < 10 −15 . As discussed in the main text, three different variants of a network growth model were used for our analysis. Here we discuss how these variants perform in reproducing properties observed in the empirical network.
We start from the degree distribution, for which the power-law hypothesis -with exponent γ ≃ 2 -cannot be rejected for the empirical network. As discussed in the main text (and shown in Fig. 4A ), all model variants reproduce well the empirical degree distribution. To provide more quantitative arguments, for all three variants we tested the power law hypothesis and calculated the power-law exponent γ using different parameters p for consortium formation. In our tests and exponent calculations we used the maximum likelihood method suggested by Clauset et al. [12] . Our results show that the power law hypothesis cannot be rejected for all the three model variants. More precisely, for V 1 the minimum p-value is p = 0.9499, and was obtained for probability p = 0.9, for V 2 a minimum p-value of p = 0.8778 is obtained for p = 0.9 as well, while for V 3 the minimum p-value of p = 0.5784 is obtained for p = 0.2. The power law exponents are shown in Fig. S11 , and are close to the empirical value for all three variants.
In addition to the degree distribution, we studied how our models reproduce other properties of the network, like the assortativity, r, and the clustering coefficient, cl [21, 22]. V 1 , which is based only on the PA rule, yields disassortative networks. Their assortativity coefficient monotonically increase with the probability p, from r = −0.1446 for p = 0, to r = −0.103 for p = 1. These values are very different from what we observe in the empirical network. In this case, the network is assortative with r = 0.166. Similar results we obtain from V 2 , which produces disassortative network, with assortativity coefficient close to zero (Fig. S11 ). Contrary to V 1 and V 2 , the third variant, V 3 , yields indeed assortative networks with r ≃ 1.45, which is very close to the empirical value.
Testing how these variants perform in reproducing the clustering coefficient, as shown in Fig. S11 , once again we find that V 3 performs best. In a collaboration network the clustering coefficient is an important measure, as it shows how densely nodes collaborate with neighbors of their collaborators. Therefore, since the clustering coefficient obtained from V 3 for p = 0.8 co-insides with the empirical one, we decided to use p = 0.8 as the reference point for V 3 . In the same line, we used p = 0.1 reference point for V 1 and V 2 because these are the minimum values allowing consortium formation, while on the same time the resulting clustering coefficient is closer to the empirical one. 
